The US Environmental Protection Agency got religion in the early 1990s with its "comparative risk" projects as a corrective to a good many politically motivated regulatory decisions made since the Agency's inception. The motivation was good except that the Agency always thought of itself as science-driven, and searched vainly for ways to make the value-laden tradeoffs necessary for any kind of environmental policy. (See Marc Landy et al The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions for the whole story.). They also had an unwavering attachment to quantified probabilistic risk as the only mechanism for expressing uncertainty (see above paper), and no receptivity to other means for expressing judgmental uncertainty. Another difficulty with EPA's comparative risk methodology was that you didn't know what to do because you might not be able to do much about the "largest" risks as they may have no "solutions" or unbearable costs.
This paper provides the alternative "problem-ranking" approach which we were expert at Applied Decision Analysis. This paper was one of the first to present comparative risk as a problem in behavioral decision theory, just getting popular in the 1990s and now mainstream even in financial theory following the dotcom crash and Daniel Kahnemann's Nobel Prize.